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C O N F I D E N T I A L / N O F O R N

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR 6 800 8046 79

1. (U) COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN (AF)/PAKISTAN (PK)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 6 800 8046 79
3. (U) TITLE: SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 790709
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790710
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQ: 790709; KABUL
8. (U) REFERENCE: INITIATIVE
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: A. F-6, B. F-6
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: USDAO KABUL
11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: ROBERT C. DISNEY, LTC, USA, ADATT
14. (U) SOURCE: A. SCI 6 800 866, B. ONE TIME SOURCE
15. (U) DIRC: NO
16. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO TWO THIRD-COUNTRY DIPLOMATS, THE SOVIET UNION ALLEGEDLY HAS THREE OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE ARE SAFEGUARDING THE INVESTMENTS THEY HAVE MADE TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION, MAINTAINING A SOCIALIST REGIME IN AF, AND EXTENDING THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE. IF IT APPEARS TO THE SOVIET'S THAT THE CURRENT (TARAKI) REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE REGIME WITH ONE THAT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BULK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE AND TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THIS NEW REGIME WOULD PROBABLY BE OUTWARDLY MORE NATIONALISTIC AND WOULD PROBABLY BE DRAWN FROM THE ARMED FORCES. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD, IN SOURCES' VIEW, NOT PROMPT A SERIOUS USG REACTION.

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22. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN DETAILS: SOURCE A. ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE PAID AN OFFICE CALL ON REPORTING OFFICER (RO). DURING THE RATHER LENGTHY (2 AND A HALF HOURS) VISIT SOURCE AND RO HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH COVERED SEVERAL SUBJECTS. THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WAS SOURCE'S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AF. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION SOURCE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIET UNION HAD THREE OBJECTIVES IN AF. THE FIRST OF THESE WERE THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE MASSIVE INVESTMENTS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MONEY WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED THE TARAKI REGIME TO SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE THE REVOLUTION. THE SECOND WAS TO ENSURE THAT A SOCIALIST REGIME SURVIVED IN AF, AND LASTLY, TO ENSURE THAT THEIR AF VENTURE, AND EXTENSION OF THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, WAS NOT REDUCED BUT FURTHER EXTENDED. SOURCE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CURRENT REGIME WOULD NOT LAST "TOO MUCH LONGER" BECAUSE OF THEIR INCREASING PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS WHO WERE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT AND BECAUSE OF ITS UNPOPULARITY WITH THE FERVENTLY RELIGIOUS MUSLIM POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN. ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO REALIZE THIS AND, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WITH ONE WHICH WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISLAMIC MAJORITY, BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE PRO-MOSCOW, BUT IN A LESS GLARING SENSE. RO ELICITED SOURCE'S VIEWS ON WHO WOULD FORM THE NEW REGIME. SOURCE STATED THAT IT WOULD MAINLY COMPOSED OF NATIONALISTIC MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET CAUSE. HE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT HE KNEW SEVERAL AF OFFICERS WHO WOULD FIT THIS MOLD, BUT DID NO ELABORATE FURTHER. CONTINUING, SOURCE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR INTIMATE GOAL OF OBTAINING AN ACCESS TO PAKISTAN WATER PORTS ON THE ARABIAN SEA. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A BASE FROM WHICH THEY COULD PROJECT THEIR NAVAL POWER TO CONTROL THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS UPON WHICH MOVE THE BULK OF THE FREE WORLD'S FUEL REQUIREMENTS. ACCORDING TO SOURCE THIS ACCESS WOULD BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE

*Baluch*

OF FRIENDLY ELEMENTS IN THE BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE OF PK. "EVEN TODAY THERE ARE BOTH COVERT AND OVERT ELEMENTS IN BALUCHISTAN, IN THE PAY OF THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE INCREASED AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCE. IN TIME, AND WITH THE REQUISITE POLITICAL CLIMATE, BALUCHISTAN COULD BECOME A SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY AND THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR LONG-BOUGHT GOAL - ACCESS TO THE ARABIAN SEA". IN SOURCE'S VIEW IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AID TO ASSIST PK IN THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF BALUCHISTAN IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION. ADDITIONALLY SOURCE MADE A STRONG REQUEST FOR USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PK WITH "CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES". IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS MILITARY AID, IF PROVIDED, MIGHT BE VIEWED BY INDIA, SOURCE STATED THAT IT WAS "LUDICROUS" FOR ANY NATION, INCLUDING INDIA, TO BELIEVE THAT PK HAD ANY HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARDS INDIA. "PK IS A SMALL COUNTRY WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES AND IT HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY HOSTILE STEPS AGAINST A MAJOR POWER SUCH AS INDIA. PK WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEES NECESSARY THAT ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY WOULD NEVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA, EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY". TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN AF AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THIS REGION, SOURCE SAID THAT "I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF" IF THIS PROVIDED NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS DEVELOPMENT MIGHT BE VIEWED BY THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE USG IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT SALT II AGREEMENT, SOURCE COUNTERED BY STATING THAT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE "TOO MUCH CONCERN" ESPECIALLY AS IT APPEARED TO PK AND MANY OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS THAT THE USG HAD "WRITTEN OFF" PK AND THIS REGION AS BEING UNESSENTIAL TO YOUR STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL INTERESTS".

*India*

*Defender's lack of U.S. interest*

DURING AN ATTACHE FUNCTION WHICH RO ATTENDED LATER THAT DAY, SOURCE B, IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION REGARDING SOURCE'S VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, GAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME VIEWS AS STATED BY SOURCE A. ONE POINT WHICH BOTH SOURCES STRESSED WAS THE APPARENT LACK OF INTEREST BEING DISPLAYED BY THE USG IN THE UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGION. BOTH SOURCES UNDERLINED THIS POINT BY STATING THAT THE USG MUST TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO HALT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION. ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) BASED ON THE ABOVE IT APPEARED TO RO THAT BOTH SOURCES WERE ENUNCIATING THE PARTY LINE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. IN AS MUCH AS THIS IS THE FIRST TIME RO HAS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION FROM EITHER OF THE SOURCES AN F-C RATING HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.

DEC 12 JUL 85.

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